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Abstract 
This paper critically assesses the globally dominant pattern of 
complex relationship that obtains among mass media, market 
economics, and both cultural and environmental change. Making 
use of Buddhist conceptual resources that link the meaning of 
development, environmental conservation and attentional 
enrichment, the effects of consuming mass media commodities are 
evaluated in ways that are compatible with Bhutan’s overarching 
commitments to enhancing Gross National Happiness (GNH). 
Contemporary media are a complex result of historical 
processes shaped by the interplay of wide-ranging social, 
economic, political, cultural and technological forces and systems. 
Understanding how media affect public culture and environmental 
quality requires gaining critical perspective on these processes and 
the multi-dimensional context of their consolidation. Here, I want 
to focus on a particular pattern of connections obtaining among 
mass media, communications technology and market economics—
a pattern of interdependence that has crossed key thresholds of 
intensity and scale to begin globally transforming the quality and 
directional character of attention itself, thereby affecting the very 
roots of public culture and effecting a systematic erosion of 
environmental diversity. 
In spite of its complex texture, the broad outlines of this 
pattern of connections can be relatively simply formulated. As a 
result of compounding efficiencies correlated with specific 
advances in transportation, manufacturing and communication 
technology, by the mid-20th century there had emerged global 
markets of sufficient reach and density to bring about a 
commodification of the entire range of goods and services needed 
for basic human subsistence, including food, clothing, shelter, 
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healthcare, education, sensory stimulation and a sense of 
belonging1. In the early phases of this process, mass media played 
a key role in coupling markets and consumers by transmitting 
advertising content specifically designed to manufacture consumer 
need. In later phases, positive feedback circuits emerged between 
market growth and media consumption that did not depend upon 
media content performing a coupling function.  
As a result of advances in communication technologies, the 
scale of media consumption crossed a decisive threshold beyond 
which the explicit content of the media has come to be less crucial 
to furthering market growth and the proliferation of consumer 
needs than the summative effects of media consumption as such. 
The most salient among these effects is the mass export of 
attention from local environments, resulting in a depletion of the 
basic resource needed to appreciate or directly add-value to those 
environments, as well as a concomitant impoverishing of relational 
capacities and commitments.  
Beyond certain thresholds of reach and density, markets attain 
sufficient complexity to begin producing not only goods and services, 
but also populations in need of them—populations that experience 
themselves as living in increasingly elective environments open to and 
yet also in deepening need of management or control. For individuals 
in such populations, opportunities for differing multiply geometrically, 
but those for truly making-a-difference to and for one another contract. 
Expanding powers for exercising (consumption mediated) freedoms-of-
choice come at the cost of diminishing strengths for relating-freely.2 
                                              
1 This list of subsistence needs combines the customary triad of food, 
clothing and shelter with four other basic needs that are derived from a 
range of Buddhist teachings, including those referring to the “four 
nutriments” and the minimal level of material support needed to sustain a 
spiritual practice. Failure to meet of any one of these seven needs for very 
long seriously compromises quality of life. 
2 Here, “power” indexes ability to determine situational outcomes; 
“strength” indexes capacity for opportune situational engagement. Power 
enables winning whatever “game” is being played, be it social, economic, 
political or cultural. Winners are accorded further power. Strength enables 
playing whatever “game” is being played in such a way as to keep all 
players interested and involved. Where power implies having relatively 
greater freedom-of-choice than others, strength implies having the resources 
needed for relating-freely with others.  
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These are very strong claims. They suggest that 
contemporary mass media are implicated in a complex pattern of 
interdependencies that compromise appreciative and contributory 
virtuosity, degrade immediately experienced environments and 
ecologies, and foster the systematic translation of locally vibrant 
patterns of cultural and environmental diversity into mere variety. 
If valid, contemporary media must be seen as having come to exert 
a potent and yet practically invisible, corrosive effect on public 
culture. 
This will come as unwelcome news for those inclined to see 
the media as a potentially powerful forum for developing national-
scale Bhutanese public culture and as an efficient means of 
widely promoting environmental conservation. For those who have 
seen the media—and especially the new media emerging at the 
developmental edge of communication technology —as vehicles for 
expressing differences and resisting hegemonic social, economic, 
political and cultural forces, they are likely to be seen as claims 
hardly worth countenancing. At the root of such hopeful visions of 
the interplay of media and public culture is the presupposition that 
the media and their underlying technologies are essentially value-
neutral—the conviction that neither the media nor their 
technological infrastructure in any way determine or prescribe 
their uses or their social, economic, political and cultural effects.  
In what follows, I hope to show that matters are not so 
simple. Media, global markets and the technologies that make 
them possible jointly express a sustained commitment to values, 
intentions and practices—in Buddhist terms, a karma—that 
occasions a complex of outcomes and opportunities which poses 
particular challenges to realizing the deepening capacities-for and 
commitments-to equity and diversity that are at the heart of 
Bhutan’s GNH-oriented public policy. 
Technology and Media 
The crucial role of technological change in the emergence of 
contemporary mass media is incontestable, and many media 
historians and critics have rightly granted a central role in 
their emergence to advances in communication technology. 
Most obviously, technological change made available vastly 
greater powers both for the mass duplication of 
communications content and for its geographically expanded 
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mass distribution. The leap of printed daily and weekly 
newspapers from local to regional and national scales of 
distribution, for example, required both greatly increased unit 
production and greatly expanded means of reliable and rapid 
automotive and rail transportation. Radio broadcast, likewise, 
made possible vastly amplified audiences for live public 
commentary, music performances, and both scripted and 
improvised dramatic entertainment. 
Less obviously, perhaps, but no less importantly, 
advances in communications technology also enabled an 
expansion of the sensory reach of the media and a radical 
extension of their potential content. Abstract, nominally 
visual media like print were first augmented by lithographic 
illustrations and still photography that allowed the 
presentation of relevant visual information/images and not 
just linguistic representations of them. The advent of audio 
recording and broadcast radio opened the sense of hearing to 
mass mediation. The invention of motion picture film enabled 
mass kinesthesia and the inclusion of gesture-based, non-
verbal communication as media content. Film, television, and 
more recently computer-based gaming enable the merging of 
visual, audio and kinesthetic content to bring about 
potentials for mass-mediated emotional stimulation and 
interactive imagination. Although we are perhaps decades 
away from full-sensorium mass media, that is certainly the 
dream of those pushing the communication technology 
envelope: the creation of convincingly “real” mass-mediated 
virtual environments. 
The contemporary scale and scope of mass media can, 
with considerable plausibility, be seen as a direct result of 
technological development. But technology itself is not an 
autonomous domain. Its development is closely allied, if not 
essentially alloyed, with changes taking place in the social, 
economic, political and cultural dimensions of contemporary 
life and, even more importantly, within emergent 
interdependencies among them. Thus, while it is entirely 
natural to begin a discussion of the impact of media on public 
culture by reflecting on technological conditions that have 
enabled them to take on the shape and scale that they have, 
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the discussion needs also to take into account the larger, 
truly global patterns of historical development in which the 
rise of mass media has played a particularly complex and 
crucial role. 
Evaluating Technologies on the Basis of Tool Use: A Category Mistake 
As a crucial preliminary to this broader discussion, a key 
critical distinction must be made between technologies and 
tools. Tools are products of technological processes that can 
be adequately evaluated individually, on the basis of their 
intended, task-specific utility. If tools do not work or work 
well, they are discarded, recycled or redesigned. Although 
tools are designed with specific uses in mind, flexibility 
obtains in how they are actually used; adapting existing tools 
to new uses commonly precedes the design and manufacture 
of new tools. Televisions, DVD players, radios and internet-
connected home computers are among the more common 
consumer tools associated with contemporary media; 
producer tools include audiovisual recording equipment, disc 
manufacturing machinery, radio and TV broadcast 
transmitters, and network routers and servers. 
In contrast, technologies are complex alloys of material 
and conceptual practices that embody and propagate distinct 
systems of strategic values. While tools occupy relatively 
limited and precisely located amounts of space, technologies 
consist of emergent, value-laden flows of historically-informed 
relationship saturating wide swaths of the entire spectrum of 
human endeavour. Technologies are not things that can, 
strictly speaking, be said to exist—literally ‘standing apart’ or 
‘taking place’ at some particular point in space—in service of 
some task-specific utility. Instead, technologies are 
indefinitely occurring events resulting in the generation of 
new kinds of tasks and embodying broad propensities for 
realizing certain kinds of world or lived experience. 
Unlike tools, technologies cannot be evaluated on the 
basis of task-specific utility. Indeed, technologies cannot in 
any strict sense be used at all; instead, technologies are 
engaged in the shared conception and promotion of particular 
interests or ends. Technological engagement means 
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consolidating specific patterns of strategic valence. Thus, 
technologies—and the values they propagate—can only be 
effectively evaluated in terms of how they affect relational 
quality and the meaning of the interdependencies they 
establish among the personal, social, political, economic, 
cultural and environmental dimensions of our situations as 
complex wholes. Somewhat surprisingly, technologies must 
be critically appraised in explicitly aesthetic, moral and 
ethical terms. 
Important implications attend the ontological difference 
between tools as individually existing things and technologies 
as indefinitely occurring event flows. First, although one can 
refuse to use particular tools and whatever advantages they 
might bestow in carrying out particular tasks, there are no 
clear ‘exit rights’ from the effects of heavily deployed 
technologies. Thus, even those people who elect not to own 
televisions cannot entirely escape the effects of televised 
entertainment and news consumption on public and popular 
culture; people who elect not to own and drive automobiles 
are nevertheless subjected to the polluted air, traffic gridlock 
and transformations of urban space that attend heavily 
deployed automotive transportation technologies. The impacts 
of a given technology on relational quality may be initially 
greatest for intensive users of tools associated with that 
technology, but eventually these impacts become effectively 
ubiquitous.  
A second key implication is that while tools can 
persuasively be depicted as simple problem-solvers, 
regardless of how many of them are in use at any given time, 
this is not true of technologies. Histories of technology 
suggest that scale thresholds obtain beyond which further 
deployment of a given technology begins generating ironic 
consequences or problems of the type that only this 
technology or its close relatives can apparently address. 
These ironic (or ‘revenge’) effects demonstrate the fallacy in 
assuming that what is good for each of us will be good for all.3 
                                              
3 For a thorough discussion of ironic consequences, see Peter D. Hershock, 
Reinventing the Wheel: A Buddhist Response to the Information Age, Albany, NY: 
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They also demonstrate that technologies emerge as higher 
order complex systems4 on the basis of novel compositions of 
lower level systems of knowledge and material practice in 
novel ways, while at the same time exerting ‘downward 
causation’ on such component systems to bring them into 
better functional conformity with their own higher order 
needs and values.5 
Confusing tools and technologies, collapsing the 
important ontological differences between them, is to commit 
a particularly ominous category mistake, especially if one errs 
on the side of considering critical assessments of tools to be 
the equivalent of critically assessing the technologies from 
which they are derived. In effect, that is to exempt 
                                                                                                 
State University of New York Press, 1999. 
4 To clarify the force of this claim, let me distinguish among simple, 
complicated and complex systems or phenomena. Simple systems—for 
example, an automobile engine or a notebook computer—comprise 
relatively few inert parts or variables. Their behaviour can be understood in 
linear causal terms and can be accurately predicted and controlled as a sum 
of the capacities of their component parts. Complicated systems—for 
example, ocean currents or traffic flows in a large city—are composed of 
large numbers of simple, interacting, and yet non-adaptive, parts or 
variables. Although the behaviour of individual parts cannot be accurately 
determined or controlled, the overall behaviour of complicated systems 
remains limited to a sum of the capacities of their simple, component parts 
and can be predicted and controlled in probabilistic or statistical terms. By 
contrast, complex systems—for example, living organisms and societies—
comprise significant numbers of interacting and dynamically adaptive parts 
or variables. Complex systems do not simply aggregate the characteristics of 
their component sub-systems. Instead, they express qualitatively distinct, 
recursively-structured orders that are capable of generating novel 
behaviours, actively incorporating histories of the situational outcomes of 
their own behaviours to shape present and future behaviour. In sum, 
complex systems are both auto-poetic (self-making) and novogenous (novelty-
generating).  
5 The notion of ‘downward causation’ is explored at length in Peter Bogh 
Andersen with Claus Emmeche, Niels Ole Finnemann and Peder Voetmann 
Christiansenet edited, Downward Causation: Minds, Bodies, and Matter, 
Aarhus University Press, Ärhus: 2000 
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technologies from any appropriate critical regard at all. 
Mass Media as Complex Technological Phenomena, not Complicated 
Tools  
The term ‘mass media’ was first used in the 1920s with the 
advent of national radio broadcasts in the U.S., marking a 
close association of media with technology that continues to 
the present day. ‘Mass media’ is now generally used to refer a 
range of technology-enabled communication systems 
including: print publishing (newspapers, magazines and 
books); electronic broadcast (radio and television, but now 
also computer-based podcasts); the internet; and computer 
games. These media categories are associated with a range of 
purposes including: journalism (the provision of news and 
information); advocacy (the provision of social, political and 
business/economic perspectives and propaganda); 
entertainment (the provision of sensory and aesthetic 
stimulation); public service (e.g., organizing disaster relief); 
and education. 
The alignment of mass media with technology that is 
evidenced by standard categorizations of the media reflects 
how the media are appraised, especially in terms of their 
impact on the dynamics of the public sphere. Unfortunately, 
however, the media have not been understood and appraised 
as truly complex technological phenomena. Rather, they have 
been treated as merely complicated tools that can be 
evaluated in terms of how well they serve the distinct 
purposes for which they are used. In essence, the effects of 
mass mediation have most often been assumed to be a 
simple, combined function of the intentions of those using the 
media—either as profit seeking producers or enjoyment or 
information seeking consumers—and the content that mass 
media deliver. Consequently, the public impacts of the media 
typically have not been assessed comprehensively—as I have 
argued should be the case for any technological phenomena—
in terms of how they affect relational quality and the meaning 
or directedness of the interdependencies they foster.  
Seeing the media as tools has deflected critical attention 
away from the media themselves to the commodified goods 
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and services passing through them and the reasons that they 
do so. Paralleling the popular argument wielded by the 
proponents of the right to bear arms—”guns don’t kill, people 
do”—the media are generally held to lack any intrinsically 
determined effects on public culture. Whether the media have 
good or ill effects on society depends strictly on who is using 
them and why. 
In sum, mass media for the most part have been critically 
regarded as an essentially neutral interface between media 
users—a means of transmitting messages and not 
communicative systems expressing and/or propagating 
meanings of their own. Media ethics has thus tended to 
concentrate on establishing codes of professional conduct for 
those generating media content (most prominently 
investigative reporters, newscasters, journalists and book 
authors); on building systems for regulating media production 
and marketing (often reflecting stances on censorship and 
worries about market monopolies); and on discerning if, how, 
and in what way specific program contents affect individual 
media consumers (e.g., the effects of violent cartoon programs 
on young viewers) 
To be sure, the intentions of media users (both producers 
and consumers) and the communicative content linking them 
do make a difference in how the media affect popular culture, 
as well as other dimensions of the public sphere. The 
importance of program content is evidenced, for example, in 
strong correlations between the consumption of violent media 
and social violence.6 The proven success of mass mediated 
advertising and the successful use of television as a 
                                              
6 A summary of scientific findings on media and violence, as well as media 
misinformation about these findings, can be found in Brad J. Bushman and 
Craig A. Anderson, “Media Violence and the American Public: Scientific 
Facts Versus Media Misinformation,” in the American Psychologist, June/July 
2001. An interesting work focused on the role of unconscious imitation in 
media consumption is Susan Hurley’s “Bypassing Conscious Control: 
Media Violence, Unconscious Imitation, and Freedom of Speech,” in Does 
Consciousness Cause Behaviour? An Investigation of the Nature of Volition, 
edited by S. Pockett, W. Banks, and S. Gallagher, Cambridge: MIT Press, 
2005. 
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propaganda tool in—to illustrate both ends of the 
‘propaganda’ spectrum—both Hitler’s Germany and 
contemporary American presidential election campaigns 
leaves little doubt as to the relevance of intention in the 
public impact of the media. Nevertheless, the effects of 
program content and producer/consumer intent do not 
exhaust the full range of media effects on the dynamics of the 
public sphere. Indeed, granted that technologies arise as 
complex and value-laden relational flows that pervade both 
the personal and the public spheres, and that their effects are 
not restricted to those making direct use of tools associated 
with them, it may well be critically counterproductive to focus 
exclusively on media users—those whose communication and 
information needs are being adequately met, and perhaps 
shaped, by the increasingly refined tools of mass mediation. 
In the following section, I want to sketch out the 
relational terrain linking mass media and market economics. 
The point of this is to open for consideration the possibility 
that, as important as the mediating effects of content and 
intent are, they ultimately may be dwarfed by the systemic 
effects of the media as complex, value-laden technological 
phenomena that have emerged through, and helped to both 
sustain and direct, a particular pattern of interdependencies 
among modern (and now postmodern) social, economic, 
political, and cultural practices and forces. 
The Bigger Picture: Market Realities and the Emergence and Flourishing 
of the Media  
It has been said that the only thing more certain to hamper 
the advance of critical understanding than generalizations is 
the failure to make them. The aerial views afforded by 
generalizations are notoriously short on detail, passively 
obliterating differences that at ground level may be 
profoundly important. At the same time, however, their 
broader horizons make possible both a significant expansion 
of what might be considered relevant and an almost 
paradoxical sharpening of detail with respect to large-scale 
patterns. Comprehensively and critically understanding mass 
media and their current and potential shaping of public 
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culture requires systematically reckoning with how the 
media’s historical evolution has affected and been affected by 
large-scale patterns of development outside of the 
communication sector. Adopting such an aerial perspective 
on the media will mean glossing over important differences in 
how mass media have emerged and become woven into the 
fabric of day-to-day life in various parts of the world.7 But at 
the same time, it will enable shedding critical light on 
whether those differences might—or might not—be able truly 
to make a difference in how 21st century media affect public 
culture. 
Within the overall patterns of events constituting the 
historical ‘terrain’ out of which contemporary media have 
emerged, I want to concentrate on four main features. These 
are: 1] the growth of national and global institutions aligned 
with such modern values as universality, equality, autonomy, 
plurality, tolerance, precision and control, which fostered; 2] 
the concurrent evolution of a globally integrated economic 
system that has successfully commodified virtually every 
aspect of human subsistence, thereby; 3] challenging and 
dissolving traditional socio-cultural roles, practices and 
identities, especially those related to direct, mutual 
contribution to shared welfare, to; 4] greatly expand 
experiential freedoms-of-choice and systematically support 
the fashioning of globally profitable elective identities and 
communities, ironically compromising both capacities-for and 
commitments-to relating freely in the realization of a truly 
diverse and environmentally enriching public sphere. 
Modernity and the Advent of a Global Market Economy 
Among the most prominent and significant features of global 
history over the past half millennium have been the 
ideological and institutional triumph of modernity and the 
consolidation of globally integrated market activities. 
Understanding how contemporary media affect public culture 
                                              
7 For a collection of essays exploring such differences, see James Curran and 
Myung-Jin Park, edited, De-Westernizing Media Studies, New York: 
Routledge, 2000. 
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involves coming to see how the media have been implicated in 
expanding the scope of market activity, but also in 
qualitatively altering the critical purchase and practical 
traction of modern values, inculcating postmodern 
sensitivities-to and celebrations-of difference in a 
technologically enabled reconciliation of tensions between the 
values of autonomy and equality. 
In his book, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of 
Modernity, Stephen Toulmin has argued masterfully against 
the long received view that the birth of modernity and its 
displacement of Renaissance humanism and skepticism 
resulted from a kind of immaculate conception—an 
intrinsically generated shift of basic values and conceptual 
frameworks. To the contrary, Toulmin makes the case that 
transitioning from the values and concept clusters of 
Renaissance humanism and skepticism to those 
characteristic of modern thought and institutions was of a 
piece with equivalently radical shifts taking place in the 
social, political, economic, cultural and technological 
domains. These shifts, he maintains, occurred as systemic 
responses to a confluence of stresses, within the public 
sphere, that were unique to 17th century Europe and that 
continued significantly to affect the trajectory of global history 
through most of the 20th century.  
No less practically than theoretically motivated, 
modernity involved the interpretation of difference as an 
expression of contingency and the canonization of 
dichotomies asserting the primacy of reason over emotion; of 
mind over body; of the written over the oral; of the universal 
over the particular; the general over the local; the timeless 
over the timely; and the logical over the rhetorical. 
Modernization meant—and continues to mean—change based 
upon the preeminence of a constellation of values including: 
universality, autonomy, equality, sovereignty, precision and 
control. These values ramified with particularly apparent 
force in the realm of politics, setting in motion nation-
building processes that profoundly revised the shape and 
quality of political space. But, just as powerfully, they 
transformed the dynamics of trade and development. 
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Global trade is not a strictly modern phenomenon. A 
quilted pattern of exchange relations linked, for example, 
imperial China and imperial Rome from as early as the 1st 
century CE. But global trade began undergoing a series of 
technologically and ideologically driven shifts in the 16th 
century that, over the succeeding three hundred years would 
bring about the realization of a truly global market economy 
through which almost all natural and industrial resources 
were commodified and put into worldwide circulation. Among 
the key values inscribed in and prescribed by these shifts 
have been: control, competition, convenience and choice.  
It is useful to identify four major periods in the 
realization of contemporary global markets: the period of 
colonial economics that prevailed from the 16 to the 19th 
centuries; the period of development economics that 
developed from the 19th century through roughly three 
quarters of the 20th century; the information economy that 
assumed global primacy over the last decades of the 20th 
century; and, most recently, the subtle emergence of a media-
sustained attention economy.8 These four periods can 
associated with technologically triggered efficiencies that 
dissolved geographic and temporal constraints on the 
expansion of market scale and content, making possible: 1] 
the successive commodification natural resources, labor, 
information and attention; and, 2] the successive extension of 
power over the production and flow of goods, consumption, 
knowledge/human capital, and a sense of belonging or 
meaning.  
An important turning point in this process occurred in 
the late 19th century. By this time, markets of truly global 
reach were fast maturing, resulting in shortfalls in the 
velocity of consumption required to sustain economic growth. 
Theorists like Thorstein Veblen were, by the end of the 
century, noting that expanding markets mandate expanding 
consumer bases and that limits exist as to how far this 
                                              
8 I have described these transitions and their wider contexts in: Reinventing 
the Wheel (op. cit.) nd in Buddhism in the Public Sphere: Reorienting Global 
Interdependence, London: Routledge/Curzon, 2006, especially, Chapter 3. 
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expansion can be driven by falling prices associated with 
efficiencies in production and transportation. Sustaining 
growth meant continuously increasing the absolute range of 
goods and services placed into global circulation. Beyond a 
certain scale threshold, the growth of overall market activity 
can only be stably realized through accelerating rates of 
consumption. In short, maximally extended market reach 
produces powerful imperatives to maximize market density, 
incorporating entirely new populations (e.g., children) and 
new commodities (e.g., entertainment) within the scope of 
market exchanges. 
In effect, increasing the density of market activities 
involved the generation of needs and problems that might be 
addressed by new, market-designed and market-delivered 
goods and services. Under the aegis of added convenience and 
expanded freedoms-of-choice, market growth came to be 
sustained by systematically finding fault with the familiar and 
traditional. Homemade soap, for example, was faulted for 
being ‘un-hygienic’—produced by rendering animal fat 
wastes—and far inferior to the scientifically engineered and 
‘pure’ cleaning agents produced by the chemical industry. By 
the mid-20th century, novelty itself had been elevated to the 
status of a selling point. Particularly in the U.S., accelerated 
consumption was successfully sold to the public as a means 
of bringing ‘the future’ into every home and neighborhood. 
Two major consequences of increasingly dense market 
activity can be noted here. First, economic growth becomes 
coupled to deepening dissatisfaction with things as they have 
come to be. In Buddhist terms, this can be seen as the 
systematic creation of an economy of dissatisfaction rooted in 
the production of papanca or the proliferation of situational 
blockages—the steadily expanding experience of 
disappointment, trouble and suffering (dukkha). Secondly, 
economic growth becomes proportionate to a tightening of the 
consumption-to-waste cycle, which translates into decreasing 
opportunities for directly appreciating or adding value either 
to the goods and services one purchases or to one’s situation 
as a whole. Beyond certain thresholds of market reach and 
density, growth has a corrosive effect on relational quality. 
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This effect is most severe for the poor, who are deprived in 
relative, if not absolute, terms of the resources and 
imagination needed for investment. Economic growth, in 
these terms, becomes systematically impoverishing.9 
Mass media have played a crucial role in making this 
kind of economic growth possible. Technological advances in 
industrial production and transportation had, by the 
beginning of the 20th century, enabled the commodification 
of basic, material subsistence needs: food, clothing and 
shelter. Over the course of the century, the needs for medical 
care, education, sensory stimulation and a sense of belonging 
or meaning were successfully subjected to marketization. 
Mass media were important throughout this process. They 
served first as a means of advertising goods and services and 
creating new kinds of needs. Later, they served as forums for 
broadly shaping and setting popular agendas for public 
policy. Finally, they began functioning as almost universally 
available conduits for marketing/distributing sensory, 
imaginary and intellectual stimulation in the form of news 
and entertainment products and programming.10 
The development of commercially viable, electronic mass 
communication, from mid-20th century onwards, was 
especially important in bringing about both quantitative and 
qualitative shifts in the relationship among media, expanding 
market reach and density, and the erosion of personal and 
communal resources and opportunities for contributing 
directly and significantly to sustainably shared welfare. Here, 
                                              
9 I have presented this argument in greater detail in: “Poverty Alleviation: A 
Buddhist Perspective,” Journal of Bhutan Studies, Volume 11, Winter 2004, 
pp. 33-67. 
10 It should be noted, here, that I am working with a Buddhist-inspired 
understanding of subsistence needs as those ‘nutriments’ required for 
sustaining human beings as persons-in-community. It is part of the basic, 
Buddhist worldview that human beings have six sense organs and 
associated ranges and qualities of consciousness: the visual, auditory, 
gustatory, olfactory, tactile and mental. Thus, intellectual stimulation is, in 
Buddhist terms, a form of sensory stimulation. Concepts and ideas are, for 
us, a kind of ‘food’—a nutriment without which it is impossible to lead fully 
human lives.  
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let me draw attention to four phases or aspects of this 
complex process. 
First, because electronic communications technologies 
were instrumental in opening up possibilities for mass 
producing and mass marketing auditory and visual 
experiences, they effectively enabled mass media to 
circumvent the literacy hurdle presented by print media and, 
in some degree, to perforate the language barriers that had 
hitherto segregated national media markets. Among the most 
readily apparent outcomes of this capacity of mass media to 
penetrate markets worldwide was the emergence of global pop 
music. 
Secondly, these new technologies also made possible the 
penetration of mass media into the lives of barely literate and 
pre-literate populations, especially children. The affects of 
television program content and advertising on children’s 
desires and expectations—and subsequently, family 
consumption patterns—has been nothing short of profound. 
Thirdly, these new technologies made possible the 
marketing of ephemeral goods—experiences or sensory 
stimulation as such—that radically collapsed the 
consumption-to-waste cycle and habituated media consumers 
to a diet of virtually unbroken product streams. An 
importantly aspect of this was the market-driven development 
of user-friendly, inexpensive and highly portable media tools 
(e.g., the original Sony Walkman and the new I-Pod) that 
allowed the consumption of mass media to be effectively freed 
from spatial/geographic constraints. It became practically 
possible to consume media products virtually anytime, 
anywhere. 
Finally, the flood of cheap, new media tools combined 
with niche marketed media content to fabulously expand 
consumers’ freedoms-of-choice in managing the content of 
their (mass-mediated) experience. In effect, this dissolved 
tensions between the values of autonomy (acting in one’s own 
individual interest) and equality (the combination of difference 
with an absence of explicit hierarchy). Internet technologies, 
in particular, made possible the realization of a virtual public 
sphere in which—at least as claimed by some cyberspace 
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visionaries—every individual can exercise the right to pursue 
whatever he or she means by liberty and happiness, making a 
difference for himself or herself without necessarily making a 
difference to anyone else. The widely recognized ‘digital divide’ 
of inequitable access to computer-mediated information and 
opportunity is one shadow of free market media; the digital 
divide or gap that allows individual user choices to occur in 
almost complete isolation is, in terms of public culture, an 
even deeper and more dangerous shadow—a direct threat to 
diversity understood as a function of mutual contributions to 
sustainably shared welfare. 
Mass Media and the Global Market Sustaining Export of 
Attention 
If the media are viewed as (or, at least, in terms of) tools that 
are used and evaluated by individuals, these ‘effects’ of 
commercially viable mass media can easily be regarded in a 
quite positive light. For any individual, having more choices, 
for example, regarding the content of their day-to-day 
experiences is certainly better than have fewer choices or 
none at all. Whether mass mediated experience is of higher, 
lower or equivalent quality to unmediated experience is, 
arguably, simply a matter of personal opinion or debate. And, 
as proved by the use of the internet to organize social and 
political activism (e.g., the movement advocating alternatives 
to free market globalization), or by the proliferation of non-
mainstream sources of information and analysis (like Z-Net or 
the blogging phenomenon), the tools that have been used to 
build global markets can also be used to take them to task. 
However, if mass media are understood as technological 
phenomena or strategically structured flows of events, then it 
is entirely possible that the sum of all individual stories about 
media use will still not tell us much—at least, not much that 
is critically relevant—about media effects on public culture. 
Critically engaging mass media requires keeping the bigger 
relational pattern in mind. To this end, I want to look at 
attention itself as a form of capital—indeed, the single most 
important form of capital for realizing diverse and caring 
communities, but also one that is circulated by and essential 
Media and Public Culture  
 368
to the ‘health’ of the global market economy. 
It is often assumed that the overall viability of (especially) 
electronically delivered, commercial mass media is a function 
of how well the costs of producing and marketing media 
commodities are offset by income from their purchase and 
consumption. With media like recorded music or cable 
television, unit charges for individual products or time-based 
charges for access to product streams are a major source of 
income; for media like broadcast radio and television—which 
supply media goods (program content) without any direct 
charges to consumers—costs are largely recouped, and profit 
generated, through advertising sales and related product 
spin-offs. The dynamics of the information economy are, in 
fact, very much dependent upon such processes in which 
flows of information and opinion intermingle to form 
immaterial attractors for both production and consumption. 
Yet, mass media play a much more important role in 
global economics than that of generating product- or 
program-mediated monetary transfers. At present scales of 
media penetration, made possible in large part by 
technological efficiencies that have allowed media 
consumption to become highly individualized, as well as 
nearly ubiquitous, mass media are habituating entire 
populations to diets of virtually unbroken streams of 
ephemeral entertainment, information and news. This signals 
a systematic and significant export of attention out of the 
environments within which mass media are consumed—
homes, schools, workplaces, neighborhoods, communities, 
and so on. Because this export is occurring in the context of 
rapidly evolving, postindustrial institutions, it does not result 
in obvious, large and lasting accumulations of attention 
capital. The export of attention from here does not result in 
its apparent import elsewhere; it is the entire system of the 
global free market economy that benefits from the flight and 
circulation of attention capital. 
Critics of mass media have almost exclusively linked the 
ill-effects of mass media on family life, personal development 
and public culture to specific—most notably, violent or 
sexually charged—program content, and these links are quite 
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real.11 But the most widely spread and relationally powerful 
effects of mass mediation center on their role in distracting 
attention from local environments and placing it into 
contingently structured global circulation. Simply stated, time 
spent consuming mass market media is time not spent 
attending to the needs of one’s family, home, neighborhood or 
local community. In countries with mature media markets—
the U.S. is, perhaps, the best, though not necessarily most 
extreme, example—time spent in media consumption now 
exceeds a per capita average of 6 hours per day.12 This is time 
not spent developing new relational capabilities, not acquiring 
new skills or refining existing ones, not passing on personal 
or cultural traditions, and not making use of locally available 
resources to meet other basic human needs by, for example: 
cooking, designing and making clothes, building or repairing 
one’s home, caring for the ill, inspiring and refining learning 
activities, creating new works of art, music, dance and 
drama, or participating in public debate, policy formation, or 
democratic governance. In Buddhist terms, mass media 
consumption functions as an asrava or effluence of attention-
energy into activities that—whatever personal enjoyment or 
sense of freedom they afford—are relationally polluting or 
wasteful.13  
                                              
11 It should be noted that the causality linking media program content and 
society is not linear, but complex and network-like. The linkages are, in 
other words, correlative—a function of interdependencies and not one of 
independent ‘causes’ producing dependent ‘effects.’ The policy failure (or 
irrelevance) of research that is critical of the interplay of mass media and 
society is itself very much a function of the rarity with which one can find a 
“smoking gun” in media content. 
12 Americans spend, on average, 4.5 hours per day watching television. 
Internet use stands at about 12-15 hours per week. Statistics for radio, video-
game, magazine, newspaper and recorded music consumption are not 
readily available, but surely add significantly to the total. Even allowing 
that some media—like radio, MP3 products and podcasts—can be 
consumed while engaged (at least superficially) in other activities, it is quite 
conservative to estimate the Americans devote roughly one-third to one-half 
of their waking hours to media consumption. 
13 It is worth noting that, particularly in early Buddhism, the elimination of 
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It must be stressed, again, that the ill effects of mass 
media on public culture and the appreciation (or sympathetic 
resonance with and adding of value to) local environments are 
not a direct function of media content. Attention is exported 
just as powerfully by so-called public broadcasting, 
documentaries, and locally produced news or entertainment 
as it is by commercial, global media. It must also be stressed 
that a significant, cumulative effect of massively exported 
attention will be an increasing reliance and, eventually, 
dependence on market designed and market delivered, non-
media commodities. That is, time spent in media 
consumption effectively mandates the consumption of goods 
and services that otherwise might have been personally 
produced (and, perhaps, traded). Mounting 
reliance/dependence on market produced goods and services 
leads, first, to a professionalizing of the means of production 
for meeting these needs, then to the erosion of local 
production ecologies, and, finally, to a consolidation of highly 
mobile, profitably rationalized global production 
monocultures.14  
From one perspective, this can be seen as a means of 
opening up economic opportunity—fostering a transition from 
a world of locally made and used crafts to one of globally 
circulating commodities. Recommending such a transition is 
a marked increase in the number of choices available with 
respect to meeting basic needs, but also—at least at certain 
points in the process of transition—a general increase of 
quality with respect to specific goods and services. But, this 
same process can be seen as trading-off or forfeiting high 
productive diversity for heightened consumption variety—
acquiescence to the seductive mandates of consumerism. As 
the attention economy matures—albeit with considerable 
unevenness at all geographic scales—there occurs a 
proliferation of differences associated, for example, with the 
development of niche markets and new domains for the 
                                                                                                 
asrava was identified with the attainment of ultimate freedom—the 
realization of liberation from trouble and suffering. 
14 See, for example, Buddhism in the Public Sphere, Chapter 3. 
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exercise of choice. There is not, however, a comparable 
enhancement of capacities-for and commitments-to making a 
difference. Indeed, an important outcome of the individuation 
of media tool use that fuels the attention economy is a 
shrinking of active opportunities either to differ-with or differ-
for others.  
Beyond a certain threshold of complexity, global market 
growth has the downward causal effect of producing 
populations in need. Consumer needs now span the full 
spectrum of subsistence, including: food, clothing and 
shelter, medical care, education, sensory stimulation, 
meaning-making and a sense of belonging. Mass media 
consumption, by exporting attention capital from homes, 
neighborhoods and local communities, plays an indispensable 
role in the deepening of consumer neediness.15 The complex 
pattern of values-intentions-actions (karma) informing global 
market economics and the emergence of the attention 
economy yields conditions in which increasing opportunities 
for exercising freedoms-of-choice are coupled with lowering 
opportunities for relating freely in the satisfaction of our own 
needs and in contributing aptly to others.  
Ivan Illich’s insight that the commodification of 
subsistence needs invariably leads to the institutionalization 
of a new classes of the poor is, here, of signal relevance. By 
effectively making sensory stimulation, meaning-making and 
sense of belonging commodified services to which public has 
ready access, the complex dynamics of the attention economy 
engender a public in need of such services. Simply stated, the 
growth dynamics of the attention economy are relationally 
impoverishing. 
Mass Mediation and the Conversion of Environmental Places to 
                                              
15 Among the most striking demonstrations of this neediness is the epidemic 
of boredom afflicting much of global youth—a generation that can only with 
great difficulty bear being ‘alone’ or present in a way that is not 
technologically or commodity mediated. The need they experience is not 
just to be entertained or to be present virtually with others, but to be 
entertained or networked with increasing variety and speed. 
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Locations 
It is not possible to accelerate rates of consumption, 
especially of goods and services aimed at meeting, as well as 
stimulating, needs for sensory stimulation, meaning and a 
sense of belonging, without intensifying dissatisfaction with 
present circumstances. Empirical studies on happiness or 
perceived well-being suggest that a threshold exists, beyond 
which further consumption and accumulation of material 
‘wealth’ do not enhance perceived well-being. On the contrary, 
evidence suggests that accelerating consumption—or 
tightening the consumption-to-waste cycle—at some point 
begins negatively affecting perceived well-being.  
Buddhist teachings on karma and consciousness are 
particularly useful in understanding this inverse correlation 
of increasing ‘wealth accumulation’ with a decreasing sense of 
well-being. The Buddhist teaching of karma can, for present 
purposes, be summarized as enjoining insight into the 
meticulous consonance that obtains between values-
intentions-actions and the play of experienced outcomes and 
opportunities. Put somewhat differently, the teaching of 
karma encourages realizing that we have intimate 
relationships with the environments in which we find 
ourselves and with all that takes place therein.16 The 
consumption of mass-produced, globally marketed 
                                              
16 The karma of global markets and the various economies—colonial, 
development, information and attention—that historically have been 
associated with them is, undoubtedly, a complex function of many 
generations of intentional activity, informed by historically and culturally 
distinct constellations of values, flowing together in the gradual articulation 
of globally shared practices and institutions. Just as doubtlessly, however, 
close ties obtain between the patterns of inequity and impoverishment 
associated with contemporary scales and depths of globalization and the 
distinctive modern and market values that have largely shaped its 
dynamics—in particular: control, competition, choice, autonomy, equality 
and universality. Human history is always a function of both intention-rich 
personal karma and collective/cultural/communal karma in which 
intentional is of largely generic importance and in which the force of values 
is, accordingly, much more prominent. 
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commodities to meet all of our basic needs, rather than 
personally or locally crafting them, alters these relationships. 
This is especially the case with mass media, which serve the 
dual purpose of providing desirable experiences while 
extracting attention from consumers’ immediate 
environments. 
As noted earlier, shifting from a world dominated by craft 
to one of commodities is not necessarily a bad thing. The 
availability of fruit and vegetables throughout the year can 
(but, as is well known, need not) enhance physical well-being. 
What is crucial, from a karmic perspective, are the values-
intentions-actions in accordance with which our relationships 
with our environments are altered. As a crucial part of the 
global market economy, in addition to their explicit content, 
mass media also promulgate a particular complex of values 
and, in order to be profitable, must also systematically affect 
patterns of intention and action. The pivotal values embodied 
within global market operations are competition, control, 
convenience and choice. Mass media are competitive to the 
degree that they are able to attract and, finally, extract 
attention—that is, the degree to which the consumption of 
media commodities supplants other practices for meeting the 
basic human needs of sensory stimulation and a sense of 
belonging and meaning. What the media offer is convenience, 
a nearly infinite array of choices, and almost complete, 
individual control over the contents of experience. 
All of these values have liabilities in terms of the cyclic 
pattern of outcomes/opportunities that they generate. 
Consider choice. Choices, in contrast with commitments, do 
not imply sustained involvement. One chooses between two or 
more things, courses of action or experiences. Although it is 
possible only to choose one out of any given range of things, 
actions or experiences, all of them are equivalent as 
intentional objects that are subject to being chosen. We do 
not have an intimate relationship with what we can choose, 
but rather an entirely contingent one. A world in which we 
have an almost infinite array of choices—like that offered by 
contemporary global media—is a world of things that we can 
instantly possess; it is not a world to which we belong, a 
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world to which we give our hearts. The karma of continuously 
expanding our freedoms-of-choice is then a karma for being 
free to not belong, to not commit, to not contribute as needed; 
it is not a karma for enhancing our capacities-for and 
commitments to relating freely. 
A distinctive feature of Buddhist thought is that 
consciousness is understood as a quality of relationship 
constituted by and encompassing the interplay of sentient 
beings and their environments. That is, consciousness arises 
between and qualitatively integrates sentient organisms and 
their supporting, sensible environments. From this, it follows 
that degraded environments are necessarily correlated with 
degraded patterns of consciousness. It follows, as well, that 
degradations of consciousness—defined generically, here, as 
an attenuation of attentive virtuosity (samādhi) or the 
capacity for sustained, concentrated and yet flexibly 
responsive awareness—will also necessarily result in 
environmental degradations. Degradations of consciousness 
will eventually result in being less and less well or valuably 
situated.  
This, in fact, is the particular pattern of 
outcome/opportunity that is associated with the controlled 
satisfaction of wants or needs: the better we get at getting 
what we want, the better we will get at wanting; but the better 
we get at wanting, the better we will get at getting what we 
want, only we won’t want what we get. To get good at getting 
what we want, we must be left continuously wanting. 
Likewise, the karmic cycle of control implicates us in finding 
ourselves in situations that are not only increasingly open to 
control, but also in apparent need of it. The ability readily to 
determine experiential outcomes leads to a systematic 
depreciation of being where and as we have come to be. This, 
in a nutshell, is what results, karmically, from the 
convenient, choice-rich and control-bestowing consumption 
of globally circulating mass media commodities. There is a 
point beyond which the export of attention from our 
immediate situation brings a mounting degradation of our 
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environment.17  
The Buddhist teaching of karma enjoins seeing that 
environments are always ‘mine’ or ‘yours’ or ‘ours’. As the 
relational understanding of consciousness stresses, we 
ultimately are continuous with—indeed, infused by—our 
environments. Environments are places in which we have a 
place—they are an expression of what we mean by being 
sentient. Consuming mass media is an act of displacement. 
Mass mediation displaces our attention, removes it from 
where we have come to be. Mass media allow locating 
ourselves elsewhere. In doing so, they render contingent—a 
matter of choice—both where we have come to be and who we 
have come to be along the way. The media allow us to choose, 
experientially, where we are and who we are, at the cost of 
reducing our current place to but one among an infinite array 
of locations or spaces that we might occupy if we wish. The 
natural world, once home, becomes a generically shared 
context for choice. It ceases being the place where, together, 
we all belong. 
Under the regime of consumption that is mandated by 
the market-driven attention economy, there is little time left 
for immediate and sustained appreciation of family and 
friends, of the day’s weather and the advance of the seasons, 
or of the subtle presences that distinguish houses from 
homes. If there is no time for appreciating what is most 
nearby—the lived environments of the home, the community, 
the village and the urban center, but also in the environments 
within which economic and political activity is directly 
undertaken—there is even less time for attending to the 
natural processes without which nothing human ever could 
have come to be. And, while the effects of degraded 
consciousness will be most apparent in the disintegration of 
homes and neighborhoods and senses of felt community, they 
are ultimately horizonless and affect every scale of 
environment from the most intimate to the most global. The 
                                              
17 I have discussed at length, elsewhere, how the consumption of 
contemporary mass media qualitatively affects consciousness (see, in 
particular, Reinventing the Wheel, Part III). 
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looming prospect of human-triggered climate change is a 
singularly troubling case in which qualitatively deficient 
patterns of human consciousness have had a corrosive effect 
on planetary health. 
Bhutanese Public Culture, Environmental Conservation and the 
Media 
It has been argued thus far that errant or troubling patterns 
of relationship have come to obtain among mass media and 
global market economies, resulting in systematic 
compromises of attentive virtuosity and diversity, at every 
scale, and in every domain, of the public sphere. This pattern 
of compromised diversity extends beyond the public sphere to 
affect even the ecological systems comprised in the biosphere 
as a whole.  
Nevertheless, the critical perspective from which this 
argument has been forwarded also allows asking whether 
there might be a scale or depth of media penetration that is 
compatible with, for example, Bhutan’s policy of development 
committed to the promotion of Gross National Happiness 
(GNH). Is it possible to make use of media tools to further the 
evolution of Bhutanese public culture and environmental 
conservation, without opening the Bhutanese population to 
the neo-colonialism of the attention economy? Or, put in 
more operational terms, how does one determine the utility 
threshold beyond which mass media—as complex 
technological phenomena—begin producing the conditions of 
their own necessity? 
The second of these questions is more easily answered. 
One cannot determine, in advance, the precise level of 
deployment at which a technology crosses the threshold of its 
own utility. It is not possible to predict when a technology will 
begin spawning problems of the sort that only it (or related 
technologies) can solve. Technologies are complex 
phenomena, and while they may exhibit quite typical histories 
or patterns of development, they are also capable of behaving 
in ways that could not have been anticipated. There is no 
amount of empirical data that will make it possible to know in 
advance when mass media will cross the line, in any given 
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society, from just providing entertainment, news, and a sense 
of meaning or belonging, to generating intensifying needs for 
(or perceived lack of) them. 
It might be objected that media history, of sufficient 
scope, can surely afford useful insights, if not accurate 
predictions, in regard to the conditions for such a crossover. 
Unfortunately, history never repeats itself precisely. In a 
world of increasingly complex social, economic, political, 
cultural and technological interdependence, it is not just that 
no particular ‘history’ is ever repeated, the very rules of 
history are being constantly rewritten. 
The first decades of television consumption that were 
experienced in the U.S. or Europe will never be repeated 
because more recently developed media complexes in other 
societies have simply leapt over them. In many Asian 
countries, for example, cellphones with extended functions 
like image transfer and email capabilities have allowed 
leapfrogging over the era of building extensive land line 
infrastructure; access to television programming by satellite 
dishes preceded (or made irrelevant) antenna-based, national 
broadcasting; direct downloading of music and films from the 
world-wide-web and a vibrant trade in (often bootlegged or 
illegally reproduced) DVDs and VCDs has enabled the 
mushrooming, virtually overnight, of consumer markets 
across the region that are accustomed to viewing the latest 
Hollywood, Bollywood or Hong Kong films within days of their 
official, theatrical releases. 
The postmodern realties of ‘time-space compression’—
most incisively analyzed by David Harvey in his book, The 
Condition of Postmodernity— do not, however, only affect 
macro-level phenomena like technology transfer and global 
flows of production/consumption. Compare the sensory diets 
of the present generation of world leaders, born in the 1950s 
or earlier, with that of children today, especially during the 
first six to eight years of life, when basic enculturation and 
personality formation take place. 
Consider the effects, first, of a shift from engaging in 
mass media consumption for, at most, a few hours a week to 
doing so a few hours per day, and the associated lack of time 
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spent in shared play and other social activities that 
encourage, not only skill in improvised communication, rule-
making and joint imagination, but also critically appraised 
reasoning and emotional maturation. 
Consider, next, the pervasive violence, physical, verbal 
and emotional, that characterizes so much of, for example, 
so-called children’s television.18 Consider the product 
placement and consumption cues ingrained in television 
shows, films, books and educational media targeted at young 
children, as well as the quick-cut editing and narrative 
discontinuities that condition the nervous systems of young 
viewers to anticipate and eventually ‘need’ environments in 
which change is constant, rapid and extreme. Finally, 
consider the computer and on-line games that constitute a 
major global media for children and young people—media 
that share all the traits just enumerated and which inculcate, 
in addition, a keen sense of competition and yearning for 
control. 
The effects of adding limited mass mediated experiences 
to the sensory diet in the first generations exposed to global 
mass media do not provide a basis for envisioning the effects 
of contemporary media diets on today’s children and youth. 
The only certainty, at present, is that their sensory appetites 
and understandings of meaning and belonging are being 
systematically adapted to meet market imperatives for 
accelerating media consumption and for proportionately 
depreciating engagement with their immediate, natural and 
social environments. 
This suggests, at the very least, that Bhutanese public 
culture and environmental policies will be served better by 
limited the overall time spent in media consumption, 
especially by children and youth. The realities of Bhutan’s 
steady integration into the global economy, and its 
commitment to increasingly democratic governance, prohibit 
accomplishing this by restrictive legislation or by 
                                              
18 The average American child, turning eighteen this year, will have 
watched 11,000 murders, killings or rapes in the course of his/her life in 
media consumption. 
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technologically constraining choices related to media 
consumption. In fact, any attempt to exert control over the 
public’s consumption of media or other globally circulating 
commodities is likely to have the same ironic consequences 
that are associated with control karma in general—a pattern 
of outcome/opportunity in which mounting capacities for 
control are inseparable from ever more intensely experienced 
needs for control. 
What is needed, instead, are policies and practices that 
will enhance the sensitivities and sensibilities needed for the 
Bhutanese people to realize the difference between taking 
advantage of what global media offer and being taken 
advantage of by them. They must, in other words, be well 
enough attuned to their own qualities of consciousness to 
perceive the onset of a relationally degrading hemorrhage 
(asrava) of attention from their own lives and life 
circumstances, and to have the wisdom and moral clarity to 
respond accordingly. This will mean taking the time to make 
a difference in how the relationships constitutive of their 
immediate situation are unfolding, sustainably appreciating 
or adding-value to them, becoming, thereby, ever more 
valuably situated. 
There are no set recipes for how to ready the Bhutanese 
(or any other) people to avert the relational and environmental 
ravages of steadily accelerating rates of consumption and the 
erosion of attentive resources needed to service a growing 
attention economy. Public policy responses must themselves 
be improvised in attunement with local conditions, as they 
have come to be. Still, it is possible to specify the overall 
direction in which public policy must move in order to foster 
the sensibilities and sensitivities needed to realize GNH 
enhancing development.  
Simply stated, conditions must be created and 
maintained within which each and every member of society is 
poised to offer something distinctively to others. This means 
sufficiently sustaining local ecologies of production to insure 
that each and every person is not becoming increasingly 
needy—the result of capitulation to the demands of market 
growth that radically compress the production-to-waste cycle 
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and that engender populations that are in almost continuous 
states of perceived lack or want—but rather increasingly 
needed. To be a needed person is enjoy kusala or virtuosity-
developing capacities-for and commitments-to contributing to 
others. It is to enjoy the bodhisattva karma of having ever 
more to offer to others, which is also the karma of being ever 
more richly endowed and valuably situated. Public policy 
must be oriented to the accumulation, not of material wealth, 
but of the noble wealth that results from skillfully 
demonstrating compassion, loving-kindness, equanimity and 
joy in the good fortune of others.  
Development along these lines involves conserving 
differences, for the purpose of insuring the continued viability 
of each member of a community to truly make a difference. It 
means carefully recognizing the limited value of equality and 
the supervening value of equity or fairness in the context of 
resolute difference, thereby conserving the conditions needed 
for realizing truly robust diversity or innovation-rich mutual 
relevance throughout the public sphere.  
 
One concrete measure that can be taken to create 
opportunities for realizing aesthetically rich and enriching 
public spaces for meeting the basic human needs for 
education, sensory stimulation and a sense of meaning or 
belonging. Environments like this are natural in the sense 
that they cannot be constructed according to preordained 
plans; instead, they can only emerge through the free 
interplay of those to whom spaces are entrusted, within 
which they can assume an abiding place. The privatization of 
experience and the creation of hybrid private/public spaces 
that are critical elements in the realization of a functioning 
attention economy must be resisted, but, in order to be 
effective, the resistance must take the form of a positive 
expression of common purpose and shared meaning-making. 
Some forms of knowledge can be acquired in private. Wisdom 
cannot. And yet, it is wisdom that is needed to promote truly 
sustainable development and the realization of truly liberating 
human and natural environments. 
 
